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Abstract. The legal realist Robert Lee Hale offered a definition of freedom as a
zero-sum game: each volitional freedom implies some degree of coercion over
other people’s freedom, and at the same time one’s freedom is subject to some
degree of control and coercion by others. The objective of our work is to develop
this idea along with the theory of positional goods. This allows us to illustrate the
externalities deriving from the ‘consumption’ of freedom and detail the role of the
lawmaker in accordance with the Halean contribution.
To protect certain kinds of freedom and suppress other kinds is one of the
principal functions of a legal system. M. R. Cohen, ‘Freedom: Its Meaning’, in
The Faith of a Liberal, p. 163, 1946.
1. The issue
Rober Lee Hale – professor of law and economics at Columbia University
from 1919 through the mid-1950s – was a legal realist who drew upon the
emerging tradition of institutional economics1 and a leading exponent of the
first movement of Law and Economics.2 In particular, Hale focused on one
of the fundamental themes of the American critical legal tradition: the theory
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1 The title of this article refers to ‘legal economics’. However, as noted by one referee, to say that Hale’s
discussion of freedom is legal may be misleading because Hale uses a theoretical framework to illuminate
questions that are legally but also politically and morally relevant. Hence, it is worth underlining that our
meaning of ‘legal’ may be intended along with an Old Institutional Economics perspective, whose Hale’s
though is an important part. Accordingly, Mercuro et al. (2006) speak about Hale as a legal economist.
2 His ideas were very influential among scholars at Columbia University (e.g. John Maurice Clark
and James C. Bonbright) and among American academic lawyers and economists. For biographical
information, see Samuels (1973), Duxbury (1990), Fried (1998), Mercuro et al. (2006), and Fiorito and
Vatiero (2011).
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of freedom as a concealed coercion – coercion in the Halean perspective
stands for restriction on others. The main thesis of this work is that Hale’s
definition of freedom as mutual coercion (i.e. that exercising one’s own freedom
necessarily entails limiting someone else’s freedom) overlaps with the zero-sum
characterization of so-called positional goods, that is, those goods for which
the positive consumption by one agent is necessarily related to the negative
consumption of the same good by another agent.
For our purpose, we have to furnish, first of all, a brief explanation of the
concept of positional goods. Although Karl Marx (1978) had already noted that
agents’ wants, demands and pleasures are largely influenced by society, Thorstein
Veblen (1899) had already emphasized the importance of one’s relative position
in society with reference to the concept of conspicuous leisure and consumption,
and Alfred Marshall, in his Principles of Economics, had already recognized ‘the
power and prevalence of the human desire for distinction’ (1961: 12), it was
Fred Hirsch (1976) who coined the concept of ‘positional goods’ in his Social
Limits to Growth. The expression social limits means that these goods arise
from the relative standings of different individuals – if you go up, I come down –
and not from physical or natural limitations. For instance, the land in Montioni
Park is physically (or naturally) scarce, unlike positional goods such as power
(Vatiero, 2009), status, prestige, honors and ‘the rarest distinctions are few [that
is, scarce]’, not as a result of ‘either the niggardliness of nature or the burden
of the labor’ (i.e. physical limits or scarcity), but rather ‘they are scarce for the
obvious reason that there is no standing room at the top of the pyramid [. . .]
They would not be what they are if they were attainable to many’ (Polanyi,
1968: 94). According to Pagano (1999, 2007), the consumption of positional
goods is a zero-sum game: a positive level of their consumption by one party
implies that at least one other party’s level of consumption must be negative.
Hence, in the context of two agents, a pure positional good is a good whose
positive consumption for one agent is related to the equal negative consumption
for another agent.
In a similar fashion, Hale represents the economy as a structure of zero-
sum positions – what one party gains, the other loses. The idea of economic
freedom in Hale’s thought relies on the idea that each person exerts some degree
of coercion over other people’s liberty – while at the same time his or her
own liberty is subject to some degree of control and coercion by others. That
is, each freedom implies at least one ‘coercer’ and at least one ‘coercee’, or
better, at least one party consuming a positive level of freedom – the coercer –
and at least one other party consuming a corresponding negative level of
freedom – the coercee. Hence, the coercer can consume freedom only if a coercee
exists, and both parties cannot consume the same level of freedom because the
total consumption of Halean freedom (as well as the total consumption of each
positional good) is by definition null (cf. also Fried, 1998: 51–54; and Ayres,
1999a).
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In more detail, following the contributions of Wesley Hohfeld,3 Hale takes
into account both the adversarial and relational nature of jural relationships:4
a legal claim by one party is related to a duty by another party, one power is
related to one liability (in the terminology of Hohfeld). Analogously, an increase
of freedom for one party (the coercer) is related to a decrease of freedom for
another party (the coercee). According to Hale et al. (1923: 54), it is always
a question of ‘liberty against liberty’. Moreover, as suggested by the title of
one of Hale’s most important works, Freedom through law 1952, the freedom
of one party can be increased by restrictions provided through the law on
the freedom of others (cf. also Fuller, 1954). This also means that through
legislation, a lawmaker can regulate and manage the ‘positional’ relationship
between the coercer and the coercee, and affect the allocation of freedoms among
them.
The novelty of this work lies in the linking of a legal concept, i.e., the Halean
idea of freedom, and a theoretical economic notion, i.e., the positional good.
This sheds light on the actual meaning of freedom in the market and in contracts,
enables the employment of economic tools in the analysis of efficiency5 in creating
or delimiting freedoms, and explains the significance of the coercion of the State
in regulating individual interactions.
The next section offers a characterization of freedom consistent with the
original contributions of Robert Lee Hale. Section 3 introduces a textbook-
like framework in which freedom is explained as a positional good. Section 4
discusses the set of ‘microeconomic’ optimality conditions using the Halean
notion of freedom. Accordingly, Section 5 is dedicated to illustrating the role of
the State and statesmen. Section 6 reviews our main findings.
2. Halean freedom and coercion
Hale does not furnish an exact and clear-cut definition of freedom. He seems
to be interested, instead, in stressing that freedom (whatever it means) is scarce
and can be allocated by legal and institutional arrangements furnished by the
lawmaker.
3 Indeed, Hale was clearly influenced by the thrust of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s paradigm of jural
common denominators and its (correlating) fundamental conceptions; see Hale (1922: 212; 1927: 523).
Hohfeld’s framework is, nonetheless, largely adopted ad hoc to explicate certain arguments rather than
as a comprehensive analytical tool (cf. Fiorito and Vatiero, 2011; Samuels, 1973).
4 A jural relation is defined as a situation of a legal and material fact through which one by his or her
will may restrict or claim to restrict, presently or contingently, with the aid of the law, the freedom of
action of another (cf. Vatiero, 2010).
5 Even if our illustration of the concept of freedom is based on a welfarist framework, further relevant
issues may come from a non-welfarist approach such as one recalling Amartya Sen’s discussion of the
impossibility of Paretian liberal and resting on subsequent literature on social choice theory (see, among
others, Anand et al., 2009).
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In accordance with Samuels (1973) and Mercuro et al. (2006), Hale drew a
fundamental distinction between voluntary and volitional freedom. Voluntary
freedom is a hypothetical case in which agents are faced merely with the scarcity
of resources in nature; a freedom is volitional when each choice also depends
on others’ choices. In other words, a voluntary freedom refers to behaviors and
choices that are autonomous and unconstrained by others, while a volitional
freedom means that behaviors and choices are limited by society (i.e. social
limits), that is, by other individuals’ behaviors and choices.6 In this respect,
coercion represents the impact of the behaviors and choices of others in limiting
one’s freedom, i.e., reducing one’s voluntary freedom to volitional freedom.
Given that volitional freedom is ‘socially’ scarce, the State by law can
redistribute freedoms between agents: it can permit certain freedoms for one
agent and exclude by coercion the counterparty from consuming certain liberties.
For instance, in each market exchange one party’s consent to a transaction
is extracted or obtained from the other through the market price, which
the law regards as legitimate. In this respect, ‘every price, like every tax,
is in some measure regulatory and to some extent interposes an economic
impediment to the use of the article for which the price is charged’ (Hale, 1939:
566).
Let us consider the early and pivotal case Alaska Packers’ Assn. v. Domenico
(117 F.99, 9th Cir. 1902): the defendant hired sailors in San Francisco for a
voyage to Alaska to fish for salmon, but when the boat arrived in Alaskan
waters, the seamen declared they would not work unless the defendant agreed
on a 66% increase in wages. The defendant who had to accept the seamen’s
requests was ‘coerced’ by the threat of strike in a circumstance that offered few
alternatives in the remote waters. Given that the defendant could not replace
them for the short Alaskan fishing season, he agreed to pay the sailors the higher
wages they demanded when the boat returned to San Francisco. Instead, once
the boat returned to San Francisco, the defendant reneged and the seamen sued.
The Court held that the increase in the wages of the sailors who threatened to
strike at short notice in remote waters was unenforceable because the choice was
made under coercion.
Nevertheless, in accordance with Halean thought, coercion in an economy
is the result of ineradicable social limits involving each interaction among
individuals. While the outcome of an independent fisher derives from his or
her choices, with the only constraints deriving from naturally scarce goods such
as the time (that is, it is a voluntary freedom in Hale’s terminology), in the case
of a fisher working together with other fishers or hiring them as in Domenico,
6 As affirmed at the beginning of this section, Hale did not offer a clear definition of freedom; however,
Halean freedom is related to scarcity referring to outside options and potential choices available to agents.
That is, Halean freedom seems to stand for freedom of choice. For an illuminating review of the meaning
of freedom of choice, see Dowding and van Hees (2009).
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the freedom to organize the activity is also constrained by social factors like the
choice of others (that is, it is a volitional freedom). In this respect, every choice
is made under coercion, both in the remote waters of Alaska and in the harmless
harbor of San Francisco.
Moreover, the lawmaker can furnish more freedoms to the employer at the
cost of reducing the freedoms of the fishers. That is, the State, with the aid of the
law, can redistribute freedoms, but the sum of the freedoms of the parties must
be null: in Domenico, the decision of the Court – the agreement to increase the
wages of the sailors was considered unenforceable because it was obtained in the
remote waters of Alaska – determines an increase in the freedom of the employer
and a decrease of the freedom of the fishers. The lawmaker or the enforcer, by
setting or deciding upon one legal arrangement rather than another, allocates
freedoms among agents.
More generally, every market transaction, Hale would conclude, almost
invariably involves volitional freedom: one coerces the other through his or
her choices. Each economy connotes, therefore, regulation and constraining
governance; the actual freedom ‘is typically volitional and not voluntary’
(Mercuro et al., 2006: 536). Indeed, each freedom is related to an ineradicable
degree of compulsion, duress and coercion because what one party gains, the
other loses (cf. Hale, 1935a, 1935b, 1943; cf. also Samuels, 1984). In particular,
‘Hale [. . .] chooses to see coercion where others would see freedom’ (Duxbury,
1990: 436). Coercion is an inevitable part of each economic interaction and it is
only a term that represents all socio-economic relationships. For this reason, Hale
does not intend the term ‘coercion’ to bear a negative connotation: ‘Coercion is
not a ground for condemnation [. . .] hence, it seems better, in using the word
“coercion”, to use it in a sense which involves no moral judgment’ (Hale, 1923:
476).
3. An analytical illustration
A further illustration can come from Defoe’s story of Robinson Crusoe. Before
the arrival of man Friday, Robinson Crusoe consumes voluntary freedom: he
spends his resources (e.g. time) in facing natural limits. When Friday arrives,
social limits emerge and Robinson starts to consume positional goods like power
and volitional freedom, given that each of his choices also depends on man
Friday’s choices, and vice versa. In analytical terms, let us indicate with R the
agent Robinson and with F the agent Friday; and with x, y and z three kinds of
goods – respectively, private (e.g. liquor recovered from the boat), public (e.g. the
air of the island) and positional (in our case, we will consider Halean freedom)
ones. We indicate with a capital letter the total consumption of every kind of
goods. Hence, X is the sum of two individual consumptions of liquor: xR + xF .
Note that both parties may consume positive (but limited) levels of liquor. Let
us consider the case of the air. There are no physical limits, i.e. no rivalry on the
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Figure 1. Consumption of public, private and positional goods.
consumption; therefore every agent can consume the total level Y:
yR = xF = Y. (1)
Finally, consider volitional freedom: a positive level for Robinson, zR, implies an
equivalent negative level for Friday, zF . Therefore, the Halean volitional freedom
can be represented as
zR + zF = 0. (2)
In a Cartesian plane with consumption for Robinson on the abscissa and
consumption for Friday on the ordinates as in Figure 1, we can illustrate the
characteristics of the consumption of these three kinds of goods.
In the case of private goods, given a certain total amount, other individuals
consume a zero amount of what each individual chooses to consume. Hence,
the consumption of private goods is represented by the segment (X; 0)(0;X) in
Figure 1. For a pure public good, instead, each agent consumes the same positive
amount as the other agent consumes. This is illustrated by the point (Y ;Y ).
Finally, volitional freedom is limited by the social scarcity, which leads to a zero-
sum game, as illustrated by the line (−zR;+zF )(+zR;−zF ) for which the total
amount of consumption of voluntary freedom is null. As with positional goods
‘what each of us can achieve, all cannot’ (Hirsch, 1976: 5), all cannot consume
the volitional freedom, by definition.
In this respect, there is a character of public-ness in the consumption of
positional goods such as Halean freedoms, albeit with the opposite sign to a
public good. For both public and positional goods, consumption by an individual
implies a certain level of consumption for others. If one individual consumesmore
of a public good, the other agent will consume more of this good (cf. equation
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(1)); on the contrary, if one individual consumes more of a positional good
(e.g. Halean volitional freedom), the other agent will consume a greater negative
amount of this positional good (cf. equation (2)). Public and positional goods
imply ‘external economies’ derived from an intrinsic ‘jointness demand’,7 leading
to a rule of vertical summation/subtraction of individual marginal valuations, as
illustrated in the next section.
4. Welfare, efficiency, and freedom
AlthoughHale andOld Institutionalism rejected the neoclassical emphasis on the
Pareto efficiency, they nonetheless considered efficiency an important variable
in legal–economic analysis. In our microeconomy characterized by three kinds
of goods (private, public, and positional goods) and two agents (Robinson and
Friday), freedom is included in the utility function f (·) (twice differentiable)
just like other economic goods. The utility functions for our two agents are
fR(xR,Y ,±z) and fF (X − xR,Y ,∓z).
Assume a private good as numeraire, for instance a certain quantity, say, a sip,
of liquor. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, consider one kind of freedom,
the freedom of dress. In particular, let us assume (as illustrated by Defoe) that
Robison is annoyed because Friday walks naked. The marginal valuations of
substitution indicated with vi(z) stand for how many sips of liquor Robinson is
willing to give up and Friday is willing to accept in order to, respectively, ‘acquire’
and ‘sell’ Friday’s freedom to walking naked. Hence, the marginal social value
of unit z of freedom is given by
vR(+z) + vF (−z). (3)
Note that although the sum of the consumption of freedom is zero (cf. equation
(2)), the impact of freedom on social welfare (as a function of individual utilities
measured in sips of liquor)may be positive, zero, or negative. Indeed, the outcome
of equation (3) depends on agents’ preferences in the consumption of freedom.
The marginal utility for one party deriving from a positive consumption of
freedom can be higher than, equal to, or lower than the marginal (dis-)utility
deriving from a negative consumption of freedom. Given that it is not clear what
impact on welfare will result from the consumption of freedom, in accordance
with Hale, coercion related to freedom cannot be condemned a priori.
Finally, let us denote by cz the marginal cost of freedom in terms of the
numeraire. Indeed freedom is costly; for instance, it calls for the ‘production’ of
specific conditions. On Robinson’s island, it means, for instance, the production
of new clothes for Friday. In the modern economy, it signifies, instead, the
‘production’ of structures for enforcing freedoms (e.g. courts, patrols, and so
7 Themeaning of jointness demand in the case of a public good is introduced and detailed in Samuelson
(1954).
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on). Therefore, the first-order condition for the ‘socially’ optimal quantity of
freedom can be written as8
vR(z) − ||vF (−Z)|| = cz. (4)
Hence, in equation (4) the difference among individual marginal valuations is
set equal to the marginal cost.
Condition (4) is different from the standard optimality condition for private
goods, where all marginal valuations of substitution between private goods are
equal to the respective marginal costs. That is, from a diagrammatic view, for
positional goods such as Halean freedom, individual demand should be derived
vertically and not horizontally, as in the case of private goods. Moreover, note
also that condition (4) is the opposite of the Samuelsonian formula for public
goods (cf. footnote 8): the rule for deriving total demand is not the vertical
summation of individual demands, as in public goods, but rather their vertical
subtraction.
Let us place the relative price (the price of freedom in terms of sips of liquor)
on the Y-axis and Robinson’s volitional freedom on the X-axis, as in Figure 2; in
order to take into account externalities, Robinson should not only pay a price for
the production cost of freedom, cz, but also a price for the relatively ‘dangerous’
effect on Friday ||vF (−z)||. Hence, the price should be a sort of a ‘double price’:9
in our case, it is determined by the price of new clothes of Friday plus the price
for remunerating Friday for selling his freedom to walking naked.
Note that in the case of a private good, the price is given only by marginal
cost and the individual marginal valuation of a potential buyer. Instead, the
double price in the case of positional goods, in general, and volitional freedom,
in particular, may bring about market failures and can justify the active role of
the State and statesmen, as we describe in the next section.
5. The role of the statesmen
Hale (1923) begins his celebrated essay on ‘Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ by asserting that for libertarians:
The practical function of economic theory is merely to prove to statesmen
the wisdom of leaving such matters alone, not to aid them in the process of
interfering [. . .] But a careful scrutiny will, it is thought, reveal a fallacy in this
view, and will demonstrate that the systems advocated by professed upholders
of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive restrictions of individual
freedom [. . .] Some sort of coercive restriction of individuals, it is believed, is
absolutely unavoidable (470)
8 It is useful to compare the reformulation of equation (4) with the standard Samuelsonian formula
for public goods: in our case, vR(Y ) + vF (Y ) = cY .
9 Double price is related to the fact that positional goods are ‘double’ rival and ‘double’ excludable
in the consumption (cf. Vatiero, 2009).
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Figure 2. Vertical subtraction rule.
Hence, given that every economic context entails coercion, the State may
stimulate by law an efficient (or more efficient) allocation of freedoms. On
the island inhabited by Robinson and Friday, the social welfare deriving from
freedom of dress is the result of the surplus for Robinson, i.e. vR(+z) − cz, and
the negative externality for Friday, as identified by −||vF (−z)||. Neglecting the
negative externality would create an overabundance zˆ of Robinson’s volitional
freedom, as illustrated in Figure 2. Hence, the lawmaker should interfere and
set legal remedies (which likely would be contested by libertarians) in order to
compensate Friday and ‘maneuver’ the relationship toward the achievement of
an efficient level of freedom, i.e. z∗.
In this respect, the problem of the consumption of freedoms is the same
problem as that of the consumption of positional goods, and it closely resembles
a Lindahl equilibrium:10
[t]he existence, enforcement or, even, the definition of property rights is as
hard in the case of positional goods as it is for the case of public goods.
However, the consequences of the failure to establish property rights have
opposite signs. In the case of public [. . .] goods, the consequence of this failure
implies that an agent consuming the public good does not get paid for other
people’s consumption; in the case of a positional [. . .] good, the equivalent
10 However, as noted by an anonymous referee, public goods rest on positive externalities, while
positional goods involve both positive and negative externalities. This distinction may be very relevant
if in a public choice perspective we consider a State with a democratic regime, because in the case of
a positional good, one party (Robinson-like) will surely vote against an intervention of the State to
compensate Friday (who suffers a negative externality), while in the case of a public good, such a party
could vote in favor of an intervention of the State to supply the good.
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failure implies that an agent consuming positive amounts is not charged for the
negative consumption of other agent’s consumption. (Pagano, 1999: 71)
Therefore, statesmen interested in maximizing social welfare should interfere
with economic matters in order to (try to) govern and regulate by law market
failures deriving from the externalities involved in the consumption of freedom.
Externalities, indeed, may emerge from positional concerns, in turn justifying
the legislative intervention of a lawmaker to safeguard agents who consume a
negative level of freedoms, or to redistribute them. However, this does not mean
that positional concerns disappear, but rather that they are ‘regulated’. Hale’s
sophisticated notions of coercion and volitional freedom can be seen, therefore,
as attempts to amend the bilateral characterization of market exchange between
private parties and to include the important role played by the lawmaker in
shaping and ordering legal and economic processes.
As a result, Hale discredited the libertarian notion of liberty – today, we
could say, such a liberty refers to Berlin’s (1969) negative liberty11 – and its
reliance on laissez-faire markets (Ayres, 1999b). However, State intervention is
not justified by Hale through the argument posed by Berlin’s (1969) positive
liberty.12 His argument instead is based on the idea that the State may be central
in the regulation of freedoms and its intervention could ‘correctly’ allocate them
in accordance with some criterion; for instance, a criterion of Pareto efficiency.
6. Concluding remarks
For Hale, as for other institutional economists such as Thorstein Veblen and
John R. Commons, the idea of an economy based upon freedom is effectively a
contradiction because of the fact that a positive level of freedom for one party
must entail a negative level of freedom for another party. That is, each freedom
is constrained in a zero-sum consumption game, and coercion represents such a
constraint. For this reason, Hale intends coercion in a neutral sense and does not
condemn it a priori; he simply recognizes its existence and underlines its basic
forms of existence in economic life. That is, Hale argued that the economy is a
system of mutual coercion, understood to comprise the impact of the behaviors
11 The concept of negative liberty refers to an individual’s liberty from being subjected to the action,
in particular, of the State. In this negative sense, one is considered free to the extent to which nobody
interferes with one’s activity. On the contrary, the positive meaning stands for the liberty of acting in such
a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental purposes, namely, achieving a sort of
self-mastery: ‘The positive sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual
to be his own master [. . .] I wish to be a subject, not an object’ (Berlin, 1969: 129). According to Berlin
(1969), this distinction is deeply embedded in the political tradition: the notion of negative liberty being
associated most strongly with the classical British political philosophers (e.g. J. Locke, T. Hobbes, A.
Smith, J. Bentham, and J. S. Mill), and positive liberty with continental European thinkers such as G. W.
F. Hegel, J. J. Rousseau, J. W. von Goethe, I. Kant, and K. Marx.
12 See supra note 11.
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and choices of others. Such coercion limits one’s freedom, shifting it from the
purely voluntary to the purely volitional.
Apropos of voluntary freedom, we offered a re-assessment of this idea along
with the notion of the positional good. This allows us to underline the social
scarcity and zero-sum game conditions of Halean freedom. Moreover, we have
illustrated economic concerns that may not permit the achievement of Pareto
optimality in the case of the consumption of freedom. Accordingly, the lawmaker
interested in efficiency may interfere and intervene in the economy in order to
regulate and manage externalities deriving from positional concerns involved in
the consumption of Halean freedom.
As a result, in accordance with Hale, the government redistributes – rather
than necessarily curtailing – liberties when it intervenes. The State by law
permits certain freedoms for some agents but excludes by coercion other agents
from consuming certain liberties. These State interventions are seen by some
economic agents as freedom and by some as coercion, with different perceptions
among economic agents. Moreover, even market exchange in the economy
is a legal structure of mutually coercive arrangements and relationships. The
price states the conditions that permit the consumption of a volitional freedom
for one agent, while restricting such consumption for another agent. Hence,
whereas the ‘libertarians’ tend to see only the State as the repository of coercion,
institutionalists, and certainly Hale, see both the market and the State as coercive.
For this reason, even if Hale did not undermine the virtues of free markets, he
rejected a priori the argument that the free market was necessarily better than
redistributive regulation by the State.
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